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Abstract 
This paper describes an exploratory extension of IIASA’s world population projections 
for two centuries beyond their regular time horizon. IIASA’s World Population Program 
recently published its newest 2007 projections in Nature (February 7, 2008) in the form 
of fully probabilistic projections for 13 world regions for single years of age with 
assumptions defined until 2080 and extended results presented up to 2100. The 
extensions presented here do not attempt to define uncertainty ranges for the more 
distant future but rather apply alternative fertility and mortality assumptions starting 
from the median of the probabilistic projections as well as from the upper and lower end 
of the 95 percent range in 2080, which is the last year for which substantive 
assumptions were defined in the IIASA projections. After that we apply several 
different fertility levels ranging from 1.0 to 2.5 children per woman, cross-classified 
with two alternative mortality assumptions assuming maximum life expectancies of 90 
and 120 years. The results for the year 2300 range from a world population of merely 40 
million to one of 56 billion. The assumptions of likely future fertility, mortality and 
migration trends based only on substantive reasoning can have a maximum time horizon 
of 30-50 years which, when explicitly accounting for uncertainty, could possibly be 
stretched to 70-80 years. Therefore, the extensions presented here should not be viewed 
as likely or even meaningful projections, but only as a sensitivity analysis of what 
would be the long term outcome of certain alternative assumptions. 
The range of alternative fertility and mortality assumptions considered here is 
much broader than that of the recent UN (2004) projections to 2300 which consider 1.85 
as the lowest possible long term fertility level. But similar to the UN study, a main 
result of our exercise is to demonstrate the great sensitivity of long term population 
trends to very small differences in fertility assumptions. In addition, our study shows 
that a world population size of around 3 billion, which several ecologists propagate as a 
sustainable population level, need not necessarily be reached through disastrous 
mortality increase – as many of them believe – but could be reached before 2300 
through the benign fertility reduction to a level of around 1.7 children per woman. 
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Exploratory Extension of IIASA’s World 
Population Projections: Scenarios to 2300 
Wolfgang Lutz and Sergei Scherbov 
1  Introduction: How far into the future should we project? 
Trends in the size and structure of human populations are more predictable than 
practically all other social and economic trends. The reason for this is that populations 
change only very slowly and we already know today with rather high precision what 
will be the size of all age groups above 25 in the year 2030. This is because these 
cohorts have already been born and their size can only change through mortality and 
migration. While mortality tends to change rather slowly and mostly in the direction of 
gradual further improvements, migration trends are more erratic and harder to predict. 
Particularly for small countries, migration constitutes the single, most important 
uncertainty for projecting population trends for the coming decades. For the younger 
age groups, the future trends in fertility also play an important role. But even if 
scenarios with greatly differing assumptions on future fertility and migration trends are 
being made, the differences in key indicators such as total population size and the 
proportion of the population above age 65 tend to be rather small for the coming 20-30 
years. There is, hence, broad consensus among demographers that projections with such 
a time horizon are meaningful and can serve an important purpose. This is quite 
different, e.g., from the fields of economic growth or political change, where few people 
think that reliable projections can be made with such a long time horizon. 
While demographic projections made today for the year 2030 tend to be 
unproblematic, extending them to 2050 or beyond already makes some demographers 
uneasy because we would be entering years in which about half of the population that 
will be alive in that year has not yet been born. Hence, the size of the cohorts born 
between now and 2050 not only depends on uncertain future mortality and migration, 
but also on uncertain future birth rates. In other words, the further one goes into the 
future, the more the projected population depends on assumptions rather than on the 
empirically given starting conditions. 
For this reason, most official agencies producing population projections, such as 
national statistical agencies, Eurostat or the United Nations (UN) Population Division, 
have a time horizon of 2050 in their routinely-produced population projections. 
Projections with a longer time horizon are produced only in occasional special studies. 
The UN has a tradition of doing so every six years, while the regular projections are 
produced every two years. 
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The appropriate time horizon for demographic projections has been a topic of 
explicit scientific consideration at least since Nathan Keyfitz’s 1981 contribution on 
“The Limits of Population Forecasting” (Keyfitz 1981). Summaries of the more recent 
discussions have been given by Lutz et al. (1996) and Ahlburg and Lutz (1999). In 
general, these assessments stress that the choice of the appropriate time horizon must 
always be based on a difficult compromise between the advantages of providing more 
information further into the future and the danger of making inaccurate assumptions 
about an increasingly distant and unknown future. Lutz et al. (1996) also stress that “the 
time scale of population projections is of distinctly human dimensions. This is not only 
because the human life span and the gap between generations have important 
demographic consequences, but also because forecasters’ judgment about the speed of 
social change depend on their personal experiences” (p. 19). And they conclude: “The 
commonly accepted threshold of a little less than half a century emerges not so much as 
a clear demographic threshold (which might dictate a choice closer to the mean age of 
childbearing), but rather from the timing of the increased subjective uncertainty in 
demographic rates” (p. 22). 
Another reason for shying away from longer term population projections is that 
the commonly held assumption about the absence of any physical limitations to 
population growth and possible feedbacks from the future course of population trends 
back to its drivers may not be true in the longer run. In the short term, it is plausible to 
assume that, at least in demographically advanced countries, these three components of 
population change will be determined in a fairly independent way. But with a time 
horizon of 2-3 decades, one may assume that migration patterns will not be independent 
of the past level of fertility, which will be reflected in the size of the younger domestic 
labor force. The further one goes into the future, the more important such 
interdependencies and feedbacks are likely to become. Since the time of Malthus, such 
feedback mechanisms have been the essential ingredients of the analysis of longer term 
population trends. Such feedbacks were also modeled in a quantitative way in the world 
models of the Club of Rome (Meadows et al. 1972) where it was assumed that around 
2015, a combination of serious pollution and global food shortages due to 
overpopulation would increase the death rate by more than a factor of two and as a 
consequence, birth rates will rise to almost pre-modern levels. While demographers 
subsequently saw good reasons for not making such specific and hardly defendable 
assumptions, the idea of trying to explicitly capture feedbacks in population projections 
was not completely abandoned. In a set of “special interaction scenarios” in the context 
of the 1996 IIASA world population projections, Lutz et al. (1996) quantitatively 
demonstrated possible paths of “overshooting carrying capacity in sub-Saharan Africa” 
or “fertility responses to rapid ageing”. The latter idea was reflected in the National 
Research Council’s (2000) study Beyond Six Billion, where it was argued that if fertility 
fell too low, governments would likely take action to increase the level of fertility. It 
concluded with the statement that “even if such policies were adopted, the fertility 
response would not be predictable” (National Research Council 2000, p. 107). This 
statement succinctly summarizes the problem with any explicit consideration of 
feedbacks in population projections: Even if some feedback is considered likely, it is 
almost impossible to make specific assumptions about its timing, about the strength of 
the reaction and the ultimate effect of the reaction. Hence, the only practical solution to 
this problem is to (implicitly) include the possible effects of such feedbacks in the 
specification of the range of fertility, mortality and migration assumptions made. While 
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this assumption is more defendable in the case of assumed fluctuations in the trajectory 
of the demographic components (as is done in stochastic population projections), it is 
more difficult to argue in the case of assumed constancy over time as is done in most of 
the long term scenarios. In this case assumed feedbacks may be partly reflected in the 
choice of which long term scenario is considered more plausible rather than modeled 
within individual scenarios. 
Finally, the assessment of the tradeoffs in choosing the appropriate time horizon 
for published population projections also depends on the ways in which uncertainty is 
communicated to the users. In general one can say that the broader the range of 
alternative assumptions considered, the further one can justify going into the future. 
Such considerations have been at the heart of the discussion about probabilistic 
population projections in general
1
 and in the design of the series of IIASA’s 
probabilistic world population projections in particular. This series of so far three 
successive projections (which have all been published in Nature, see Lutz et al. 1997, 
2001, 2008b) used expert argument based exercises for defining a range of assumptions 
for two points in time: 2030 and 2080. The assumed ranges in 2030 were defined by 
more specific quantitative analyses and arguments than the more speculative ranges for 
2080. The choice of ranges was made after examining independent studies of the 
variance in past time series and ex post error analysis of existing series of past 
projections (see Lutz et al. 2004). While it was already considered problematic to make 
assumptions as far as 2080, this year was considered the absolute limit for substantive 
reasoning about likely levels. With respect to the tradeoffs discussed above, the costs in 
terms of credibility and likelihood of making unreasonable assumptions exceeded the 
possible gains in terms of useful information. But it was decided to present results up to 
2100 which still illustrate the momentum of population dynamics beyond 2080 when 
keeping all rates at their 2080 level. 
Given all these important caveats with very long term population projections, it 
was somewhat surprising when in 2004 the United Nations Population Division 
published a study entitled World Population to 2300 which presents a number of 
alternative projections (scenarios) for 192 individual countries up to the year 2300 (UN 
2004). This not only doubled the time horizon of their earlier occasional long range 
projections (which was 2150), but also moved from the projection at the level of major 
world regions to a 300 year projection of individual countries. Since the vast majority of 
countries that are UN members today did not exist 300 years ago (including the USA), it 
is not clear what motivated the authors to assume that all these countries will continue 
to exist with identical borders 300 years in the future. Given the speed in which new 
countries have been forming through the dissolution of bigger ones over the past two 
decades alone, and the groups of existing countries that are giving up national 
sovereignty to form a larger union, such as the EU, it seems odd to assume that in 2300, 
the world will still be structured in terms of the same nation states we see today. Making 
long range projections by continents (major world regions) is more defendable because 
the continental drift occurs much more slowly than changes in politically defined 
borders. Hence, the choice of the population aggregates that are being projected needs 
to enter the consideration of tradeoffs with respect to the choice of time horizon. 
                                                 
1 For a comprehensive discussion of this field, see a special issue of the International Statistical Review 
entitled “How to deal with uncertainty in population forecasting” edited by Lutz and Goldstein (2004). 
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Without substantive justification and without reference to the above described 
literature, the UN (2004) report presents the long term implications of three main 
fertility assumptions which are based on assumed global convergence to the total 
fertility rates (TFR) of 2.35, 2.05 and 1.85. Two additional scenarios were presented 
“for analytical purposes” which keep all fertility rates constant at current levels, 
resulting in 134 trillion people in 2300, and forcing fertility to the exact level that will 
produce zero growth under the assumed continued increase in life expectancy. No 
alternative scenarios with respect to the future course of mortality are being defined 
which makes it impossible to use the study with respect to the uncertainty of future 
population ageing. Beyond 2050 zero net migration per country is assumed, which is 
certain to be incorrect, but it is admittedly difficult to come up with any alternative 
numerical assumption. 
The plausibility of the range covered by these alternative assumptions will be 
discussed in more detail below. Here it suffices to say that the lowest considered long 
term fertility level of 1.85 is actually identical to the assumed medium variant (most 
likely) fertility level up to 2050. Although more than 50 countries currently have 
fertility rates below 1.85, this is assumed to never and nowhere be the case in the longer 
term future. Hence, the guiding principle of this exercise seems to be to define the 
projections in terms of their results rather than in terms of a plausible range of driving 
forces. The central assumptions try to produce near constancy in national population 
sizes with the high and low scenarios only allowing minimal deviations from the 
fertility levels that would produce these results. 
The problematic UN (2004) study and in particular the (mis)interpretation of its 
findings in the international community are the main motivations for us to produce these 
quite different, long term population scenarios which cover a broader range of possible 
fertility and mortality assumptions. The main carry home message from the UN study 
seems to have been that a sophisticated projections exercise shows that the most likely 
long run population future is that of a world population increasing to around 9 billion by 
the second half of this century and then remaining almost constant at this level over the 
next centuries. Similarly, all countries in the world would likely have constant long term 
population size. This “result”, however, was the starting assumption of the whole 
exercise and has no visible scientific basis. Medium fertility levels have simply been 
chosen in order to produce such a predefined result. But there may be equally plausible 
or even more plausible alternative visions of long term futures for the number of 
humans on this planet. And since specific numbers about population trends beyond 
2100 are requested and being used by modelers in the field of climate change, it seems a 
worthwhile exercise to try to give such numbers a bit more science based attention. 
2  Definitions and reasoning behind alternative scenarios 
2.1  The IIASA probabilistic world population projections as a basis 
The projection exercise described in this paper presents an exploratory extension of 
IIASA’s world population projections for two centuries beyond their regular time 
horizon. IIASA’s World Population Program recently published its newest 2007 
projections in the form of fully probabilistic projections for 13 world regions for single 
years of age with assumptions defined until 2080 and extended results presented up to 
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2100. These 2007 projections, published under the title “The coming acceleration of 
global population ageing” (Lutz et al. 2008b) are an update of earlier projections 
published under the title “The end of world population growth” in Nature in 2001 and in 
a full length book under the same title in 2004 (Lutz et al. 2001, 2004). The methods 
used for this set of probabilistic projections are comprehensively described in that book. 
It also includes lengthy substantive justifications of the specific fertility, mortality and 
migration assumptions. The 2007 update of the 2001 projections includes one 
methodological innovation and two noteworthy revisions of the fertility assumptions. 
Methodologically, the new projections also consider uncertainty ranges for the starting 
conditions of the projections for countries with unreliable information about current 
conditions. This is particularly relevant for China, where published fertility levels for 
around 2000 range from 1.2 to 1.8. After the analysis of about 30 different estimates of 
Chinese fertility levels, we assumed a median TFR of 1.5 with an 80 percent uncertainty 
range from 1.3 to 1.7 for the year 2000 (Lutz et al. 2007). This downward revision of 
Chinese fertility has visible impacts on the projected world population because of the 
great weight of China. However, this is partly compensated by an upward revision for 
African fertility rates which did not decline as rapidly as assumed in 2001. This is partly 
due to stalled fertility declines in some African countries due to worsening overall 
conditions, and in particular, a stagnation or even decline in female basic education. 
But the overall picture drawn by the 2001 and 2007 projections is very similar. 
The probability that the world population will peak in size before the end of the century 
has now increased from 86 to 88 percent. Figure 1 puts the results of these probabilistic 
projections to 2100 into a millennial perspective, plotting world population size from 
1000 AD to 2100. It shows that for centuries, world population has been below half a 
billion until around 1800, when population growth started to take off. The increase 
accelerated tremendously during the 20
th
 century, when world population increased 
from 1.6 billion in 1900 to 6.1 billion in 2000. At the global level, the population 
growth rate was highest during the late 1960s, peaking at just over 2 percent per year. 
Since then the growth rate has been declining. Absolute increments started to decline 
around 1990. The graph also shows the decilies of uncertainty distribution of future 
world population based on IIASA’ probabilistic projections. It shows that the 80 percent 
range for 2100 goes from less than 6 billion to more than 12 billion. The line with dots 
in the center gives the median of the 2000 independent simulation runs. It shows a peak 
of 8.9 billion around 2070 and then falls to 8.4 by 2100. The 80 percent uncertainty 
range for 2100 is from 6.2 to 11.1 billion, i.e. a range of five billion. This quantification 
of uncertainty helps to put our thinking about long term population trends into 
perspective. 
 
 6
 
Figure 1.  Historical world population growth and the results of IIASA’s probabilistic 
projections: Plotting world population size from 1000 AD to 2100. 
 
Within this century the uncertainty of the future proportion of elderly in our 
society is even larger. Figure 2 plots the resulting uncertainty ranges for the proportion 
of the population above the age of 80 in Western Europe. The proportion is almost 
certain to increase over the coming decades from currently around 3 percent of the 
population to between 6 and 14 percent in 2050. But during the second half of the 
century the uncertainty will explode to an incredible 80 percent range; from 8 to 37 
percent of the entire population will be above the age of 80. This large uncertainty in the 
future proportion of elderly is a function of the current scientific uncertainty about the 
likely future course of old age mortality. While one school of thinking assumes that in 
the West we will not see much further increase in life expectancy, the other school 
assumes sustained further increases, if not an acceleration in the increase of life 
expectancy due to bio-medical progress. Without being able to scientifically reject one 
or the other view, the only thing a forecaster can do is to try to honestly reflect this 
uncertainty in the projections themselves and not pretend to know more than we know. 
Figure 2 also shows two horizontal lines in 2100 which represent the values given by 
the high and low variants of the UN long term population projections. These variants 
differ from our projections in two ways: First, they are lower because the UN assumes a 
slower increase in future life expectancy. Second, the interval between the two variants 
is very narrow because the UN does not consider alternative mortality scenarios, as 
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mentioned above. The difference between the two lines is only a consequence of 
alternative fertility assumptions, i.e., different total population sizes by which an 
identical absolute number of elderly will be divided to calculate the proportion. For this 
reason the UN projections cannot be expected to describe the uncertainty associated 
with future ageing in a meaningful way. 
Figure 2.  The uncertainty distribution of the proportion of the population above age 80 
in Western Europe. Source: Lutz et al. (2008b: 718). 
 
For the exploratory extensions of these projections to 2300, we considered two 
alternative approaches: 
(1) Start the alternative assumptions in the year 2005. For this century, have them 
cover the full uncertainty range of the probabilistic projections while assuming 
continuations at the same levels for another 200 years. This full range would, 
however, result in an absurdly broad range of results which would likely 
generate feedback mechanisms that would check population growth or keep our 
species from voluntary extinction. This is the reason why the UN (2004), who 
start their alternative scenarios in 2000, chose to define such extremely narrow 
fertility ranges. As a compromise, we will present selected scenarios with more 
moderate fertility levels that originate at the high and low ends of the 95 percent 
distribution in 2080 when those projections stop making substantive 
assumptions. 
(2) Leave the uncertainty ranges of the 2007 IIASA projections as they are and only 
define alternative scenarios starting from the median of the distribution in 2080. 
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By doing so it will be evident to the user that these scenarios are not intended to 
cover the full range of uncertainty but are indeed only exploratory exercises in 
population dynamics. We chose this approach for most of our scenarios 
precisely for this reason, so that users do not mistake it for a comprehensive 
assessment of possible future ranges as can easily happen when presented with 
any range of alternative trends. 
In the following projections we study a cross-classification of five different 
fertility scenarios with two mortality scenarios. Some of the assumptions have been 
applied as starting in 2005, and all assumptions have been applied as starting from the 
median in 2080. 
2.2  Two alternative mortality scenarios 
The choice of a large number of different fertility scenarios cross-classified with only 
two mortality scenarios reflects the greater sensitivity of very long term future 
population trends to fertility. But it also reflects the great dichotomy of the current 
scientific discussion about the likely future of old age mortality. There are two 
vigorously opposed schools of thinking, one suggesting that we will only see very 
modest future increases in life expectancy (possibly even a decline) in today’s 
industrialized countries, while the other claims that we will see continued increases in 
life expectancy which possibly may even accelerate due to medical progress. Both 
positions have weighty arguments in their support. The “pessimistic” school of thinking, 
represented by Jay Olshansky (Carnes and Olshansky 2007), points primarily at 
negative changes in lifestyle leading, e.g., to higher obesity rates for younger cohorts, 
possible new infectious diseases and some fundamental constraints in our biology. The 
“optimists,” represented by James Vaupel and Ken Manton, point out that there are no 
signs of a leveling off in the increase in life expectancy in the leading countries (Manton 
1991; Oeppen and Vaupel 2002) and that our biology does not suggest a natural limit to 
life expectancy, at least not anything below age 120. 
When trying to translate these opposing views about the future of mortality into 
alternative scenario assumptions, we chose the following rather simple 
operationalization. As in the medium assumption of the current IIASA probabilistic 
world population projections to 2100, it is assumed that life expectancy will continue its 
past trend of roughly two years of additional life expectancy per decade. This trend will 
be applied to all world regions. The only difference is the cut off point. In the first 
scenario representing the pessimistic view, the increase will be stopped whenever life 
expectancy (for both sexes) reaches 90 years. In the tables, this scenario will be labeled 
“LEMAX=90”. For the optimistic case, a life expectancy of 120 years was chosen as 
the point at which it stops to increase, labeled “LEMAX=120” in the tables. The time at 
which these limits are reached will vary from region to region depending on their 
starting levels. While for the pessimistic scenario the assumed limit will be reached 
most likely during this century (and only for some current high mortality regions during 
the next one), the optimistic scenario will come close to the assumption of ever 
continuing life expectancy and limits will only be reached during the 23
rd
 century. 
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2.3  Five alternative fertility scenarios 
There is no widely accepted theory about the future course of fertility for countries that 
have reached the late phases of the universal process of demographic transition. The 
demographic transition paradigm assumes that at some point in their history, all human 
societies go through an irreversible process in which death rates fall and then with some 
time lag (which can be several decades) birth rates also start to fall. The different timing 
of the two declines is due to the fact that people always want their own mortality and 
that of their children to be lower whenever possible. This is not the case with birth rates, 
where pro-natalist norms are deeply embedded in most human cultures. It takes time for 
parents to understand that more of their children will survive and they only need fewer 
births in order to have a certain desired number of surviving offspring. Together with 
general social and economic development and in particular higher education, this results 
in the fertility transition which is currently well underway in most of the world’s 
societies. Actually, already more than half of the current world population has fertility 
below replacement (Wilson 2004). While the irreversibility of the demographic 
transition implies that fertility will not increase back up to high pre-transition levels, it 
is completely unclear how low fertility will fall in the future. Theoretically, only zero is 
the bottom for possible future fertility rates. 
Lutz (2006) recently produced a comprehensive review of different science 
based arguments that would suggest either further declines in fertility or a modest 
recovery of current low fertility levels in Europe. Viewed together, these different 
arguments can be interpreted as suggesting (unless unexpected new reasons come up in 
the future) that a plausible range of future fertility in modern societies that have gone 
through the process of demographic transition is somewhere between 1.0 and 2.5 
children per woman on average. 
This likely range of future fertility between 1.0-2.5 is in line with the conclusion 
of a National Academy of Sciences Panel on the future of world population which gave 
the (admittedly very vague) statement that the future fertility range in post-demographic 
transition countries should not be too different from the range of fertility levels 
observed today in such societies (National Research Council 2000). This range goes 
from around 0.8 in Hong Kong, Macao and the lowest fertility provinces in some low 
fertility countries, to 1.08 in Korea as the lowest fertility registered in a big nation state, 
to a high of around 2.0 in the USA. However, some of these very low levels may be 
short term trends where rates are depressed by the tempo effect. Hence, a range from 1.0 
to 2.5 seems to be a sufficiently broad range to cover all future fertility trends that can 
be considered plausible for longer term averages from today’s perspective. We also 
experimented with a TFR of 0.5, but this resulted in a near disappearance of the human 
species from this planet before 2300. Hence, we chose to show the results for the 
following five long term total fertility rate levels: 1.0, 1.5, 2.0 and 2.5, with 1.7 added as 
a plausible central assumption. 
When discussing long term fertility trends, the notion of replacement fertility is 
often used as a guiding principle. Traditionally, replacement fertility has been assumed 
to be at 2.1 children per woman, which is the fertility that every woman needs on 
average to have two offspring surviving to reproductive age. This rate, however, is 
rarely exactly 2.1. In societies with high child mortality, such as in Africa, this ratio is 
around 2.3, whereas in very low mortality societies it is below 2.1. Even in the absence 
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of child mortality, however, it is not 2.0 because the traditional definition of 
replacement fertility also considers the sex ratio at birth, i.e., the fact that somewhat 
over half of all babies born are boys. Another aspect of this view of replacement fertility 
is that it only considers replacement at the aggregate population level, i.e., two people (a 
man and a woman) having on average two children. We therefore call this the 
population replacement level. 
Alternatively, one can think of an individual replacement level. This is in line 
with the frequently mentioned individual level rationale that every person wants to 
replace him/herself with one child. If every man or woman has one child on average, the 
TFR is 1.0. Because it takes two – biologically still a woman and a man (or at least his 
sperm) – to produce a child, the two people in such a condition typically share a child, 
which does not make it any less their own child. This individual level replacement 
rationale is not only reflected in the prominent and highly effective Chinese one child 
policy, it is also reflected in the answers of many fertility surveys in Europe. Asked for 
their motivation to have a certain number of children, many young men and women say 
they want to have the first child to reproduce themselves and have the experience of 
having a child, while a second child is mostly desired as a companion for the first child, 
something that is highly influenced by social norms. A possible alternative motivation 
for two children, namely, to have one as a replacement for dad and another for mom is 
hardly ever stated in opinion surveys. In this view, individual replacement level fertility 
implies a TFR of 1.0 which also implies that some couples have more than one child to 
compensate for people who (for whatever reasons) remain childless. 
In our view, a likely range of future fertility is somewhere between individual 
and population level replacement (i.e., in low mortality conditions roughly between 1.0 
and 2.0) with room for upward deviation to 2.5 (which is more likely than a TFR of 0.5, 
which would result in a disappearance of world population before 2300). But what 
would be the optimal level of fertility from a societal point of view? Such an optimal 
level would likely be above the individual replacement level of 1.0 since this would 
result in a halving from one generation to the next; the resulting strong ageing and 
shrinking would probably bring a high cost in terms of intuitional discontinuities. But 
the optimal fertility level can be somewhat below the population replacement level for 
several reasons, ranging from living space and global environmental considerations to 
the desire to invest more into the education of a slowly diminishing number of children. 
But it cannot be too far below population replacement because of the above mentioned 
social and economic discontinuities – e.g., for the pension and health care systems – that 
result from extended periods of very low fertility. This complex question of an optimal 
fertility level can by no means be treated exhaustively here. Many of the criteria 
involved have been discussed elsewhere (Lutz et al. 2004) and more work on this is 
currently underway. Here it should suffice to assume that a TFR of around 1.7 is a good 
candidate for a long term optimal fertility level. This is the rationale for having a 
specific scenario based on a stable long term level of 1.7. Viewing all things together, 
long term fertility around this level not only seems to be the most desirable, but also the 
most likely in the long run – a fortunate coincidence. The nearer term future of countries 
with incomplete demographic transitions, particularly in Africa, looks much less 
fortunate. 
A fifth fertility scenario does not assume that in the very long run all world 
regions converge to one specified level of fertility, but that permanent fertility 
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differentials remain. Since in the IIASA population projections fertility levels in 2080 
are defined as a function of population density (Lutz et al. 2004; Lutz and Ren 2002) 
within the possible range of 1.5 to 2.0, these 2080 levels are then kept constant until 
2300. In the figures and tables this scenario is labeled “TFR=IIASA”. Because of the 
persistent fertility differential, this scenario is expected to result in major changes in the 
distribution of the world population of the different regions. 
3  Results 
3.1  Alternative scenarios starting from 2005 
As discussed above we have included a few scenarios which, for this century, follow the 
upper and lower 95 percent uncertainty bounds of the IIASA probabilistic projections, 
and then continue with the high and low fertility assumptions, respectively. All the other 
scenarios start from the median of the probabilistic projections in 2080 (see Figure 3) 
and will be described in more detail below. 
 
Figure 3. Total world population in billions: Probabilistic projections until 2100 (yellow 
[light gray] 95% interval; green [dark gray] 60%; blue [black] 20%) and extensions to 
2200 (for scenario labels, see text below). 
 
Figure 4 depicts the consequence of a long term TFR of 2.5 (top line) which 
starts from a population trajectory at the upper end of the 95 percent uncertainty range 
of the IIASA probabilistic projections. By 2080 this path will have resulted in a world 
population size of about 12 billion. Applying a constant TFR of 2.5 from 2080 onwards 
for all world regions and starting from the age structure of the above mentioned high 
path, this would lead to moderate further population increase during the first half of the 
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22
nd
 century and an accelerating path thereafter, reaching 22 billion in 2200 and 47 
billion by 2300. This is combined with the mortality assumption that increases in life 
expectancy stop at 90 years. For the alternative assumption that life expectancy will 
continue to increase to 120, the world population would be 24 billion in 2200 and 56 
billion in 2300. The difference is much larger by 2300 because the difference between 
the two mortality assumptions will only come to bear during the 23
rd
 century. 
 
 
Figure 4.  Alternative fertility assumptions resulting in different paths of world 
population size to 2300 (combined with the assumption that life expectancy will not 
improve beyond 90 years). 
 
On the low end of the spectrum, a similar exercise has been applied. A 
population path that comes close to the lower 95 percent uncertainty bound in 2080 has 
been chosen and from there a constant TFR of 1.0 has been applied. Not surprisingly (as 
shown in Figure 4) this results in a further, quite rapid world population decline. 
Starting at a world population size of 5.9 billion in 2080, the number would fall to 4.5 
billion in 2100 and 1.9 billion in 2100. By 2200 this extreme scenario on the low end 
would result in a world population of about half a billion and by 2300 of a mere 40 
million. Combining this with a life expectancy limit of 120 years instead of 90 years 
would result in twice the world population of 80 million in 2300. This unlikely case 
would indeed imply a very old society with more than half of its population above the 
age of 90. While this is clearly hard to imagine, the assumptions leading to such an 
extreme situation are not absurd. A long term TFR of 1.0 may seem low from today’s 
perspective, but it sounds less extreme when one considers that even the most recent 
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official longer term population projections of Japan assume a TFR constant at 1.2 as the 
most likely variant. 
3.2  Scenarios beyond 2080: Global population size 
In the following we will take a more detailed look at scenarios that start from the 
median of the probabilistic population projections in 2080. As argued above this 
approach best illustrates the purely exploratory nature of this exercise in population 
dynamics. The probabilistic projections for this century shall not be interpreted as a 
comprehensive assessment of likely future population trends. Instead, they should 
inform the reader about the consequences of different long term assumptions beyond 
2080 that cover a broader range of not-impossible assumptions than have been 
previously published. 
As for the more extreme scenarios discussed above, the projections have been 
carried out at the level of 13 world regions corresponding to the regions used by the 
IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change) in their long term emissions 
scenarios (Nakićenović et al. 2000; Lutz et al. 2004) In this section the tables and 
figures give the results of this exercise for the aggregated total world population for 
three indicators: Total population size, proportion of the population above the age of 80, 
and the cohort succession ratio 20/60, i.e., the number of people at age 20 per every 
person at age 60. The following section will look at selected results by continents. 
The results shown in Table 1 speak for themselves and do not need much 
discussion. As a consequence of the assumption that all scenarios follow the IIASA 
median until 2080, the paths only start to diverge by 2100. The differences among the 
scenarios become more distinct, the further one goes into the future. As expected the 
scenarios assuming a maximum life expectancy of 120 are always higher than the 
corresponding fertility scenarios with a maximum life expectancy of 90. Also, as 
expected, the scenarios assuming a higher level of fertility consistently have higher 
population sizes. Even very small differences in fertility levels have huge long term 
effects. A TFR of 1.5, which is about the average fertility level of the European Union 
today (combined with a maximum life expectancy of 90 years), results in a total world 
population of 1.11 billion in 2300. A long term TFR of only 0.2 children higher would 
result in 2.43 billion, more than twice that level. Assuming that the life expectancy limit 
is 120 instead of 90, this will add almost another 50 percent to the world population in 
2300. This also illustrates that mortality assumptions are by no means irrelevant for the 
future total population size. 
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Table 1.  Total population size of the world: 14 alternative extensions to 2300. 
 2000 2050 2100 2150 2200 2250 2300 
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=90 6.06 8.82 8.55 6.91 5.38 4.22 3.38 
TFR= 1, LEMAX=90 6.06 8.82 8.28 4.59 1.40 0.38 0.10 
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=90 6.06 8.82 8.46 6.03 3.54 1.99 1.11 
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=90 6.06 8.82 8.53 6.73 4.89 3.46 2.43 
TFR= 2, LEMAX=90 6.06 8.82 8.64 7.91 7.67 7.34 6.97 
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=90 6.06 8.82 8.83 10.29 15.00 21.88 31.73 
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=120 6.06 8.82 8.64 7.38 6.34 5.51 4.66 
TFR= 1, LEMAX=120 6.06 8.82 8.37 5.05 1.99 0.68 0.21 
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=120 6.06 8.82 8.55 6.50 4.37 2.83 1.72 
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=120 6.06 8.82 8.63 7.19 5.82 4.63 3.49 
TFR= 2, LEMAX=120 6.06 8.82 8.74 8.38 8.75 9.16 9.20 
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=120 6.06 8.82 8.92 10.76 16.37 25.30 38.10 
 
 
As the comparison between Figures 5 and 6 illustrates (see also Table 2), the 
difference between population sizes resulting from assuming a life expectancy ceiling at 
90 versus 120 years is almost entirely due to different numbers of people above the age 
of 80. While the absolute number of people above age 80 increases almost 
monotonically in all scenarios, the proportion of elderly depends crucially on the 
fertility assumptions. With global fertility constant (after 2080) at 2.0 or 2.5, the 
proportion of those above age 80 will only increase to around 10 percent in the case of a 
life expectancy limit of 90 and to 20-30 percent in the case of a limit at 120. In the other 
extremes of fertility falling to 1.0 or 0.5, the proportion above age 80 would increase to 
well above half of the entire population. In the more likely case of global fertility 
converging to 1.7, the global proportion of persons above age 80 would be stable around 
15 if a life expectancy limit of 90 years is assumed, and increase to around 40 percent if 
the limit is 120 years. 
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Figure 5.  Proportion of the world population above the age of 80 according to 
alternative fertility scenarios, with life expectancy assumed to level off at 90. 
 
Figure 6.  Proportion of the world population above the age of 80 according to 
alternative fertility scenarios, with life expectancy assumed to level off at 120. 
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Table 2.  Proportion above age 80 in the world: 14 alternative extensions to 2300. 
 2000 2050 2100 2150 2200 2250 2300 
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=90 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 
TFR= 1, LEMAX=90 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.20 0.28 0.28 0.28 
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=90 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.15 0.18 0.19 0.19 
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=90 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.16 
TFR= 2, LEMAX=90 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=90 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09 
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=120 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.18 0.27 0.33 0.36 
TFR= 1, LEMAX=120 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.26 0.49 0.59 0.64 
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=120 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.21 0.33 0.42 0.46 
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=120 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.19 0.28 0.36 0.40 
TFR= 2, LEMAX=120 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.16 0.22 0.29 0.32 
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=120 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.12 0.15 0.20 0.22 
 
It seems difficult to imagine societies in which more than half of the population 
is above the age of 80, yet levels of 15-30 percent above age 80 seem more feasible 
under the assumption of a continued increase in life expectancy. And clearly this could 
only happen if an 80 year old of the 23
rd
 century were on average much healthier than 
an 80 year old today. They would probably resemble the 40-60 year olds today and 
would still be actively involved in the labor force. Otherwise such societies could not 
function. 
Another interesting indicator of age structure is the ratio of two specific single 
year age groups. Lutz and Sanderson (2005) introduced such indicators under the name 
of “cohort succession ratios” (CSR). These could be either adjacent cohorts or cohorts 
that are otherwise functionally related, such as those at the typical ages of entering and 
leaving the labor market. Looking at Table 3, the ratio of the numbers of 20 to 60 year 
olds somehow captures the numbers of people entering the labor force to those leaving 
the labor force under today’s retirement conditions in industrialized countries. It 
illustrates that currently and in the near future, about twice as many people will enter the 
labor market globally per year than leave it. Therefore, unemployment is likely unless 
the job market expands very rapidly. But by 2050 on the global level, the situation will 
be much easier for the job market and the number of entries will roughly equal the 
number of exits under the (greatly simplifying) assumption that the mean age of 
retirement is constant at around 60. This global average, however, hides huge regional 
differences. In 2050 in Africa, this ratio will still be 3.5, while in Eastern Europe it will 
already be as low as 0.5. This means that in Eastern Europe for every young person 
entering the labor market, two will retire, while at the same time in Africa, 3-4 young 
people will enter the labor market for every one who exits. Whether there will be 
massive international migration to compensate for some of these differentials, or 
whether investment will flow from the rapidly ageing to the still growing populations is 
difficult to predict. 
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Table 3.  Ratio of 20 to 60 year olds in the world: 14 alternative extensions to 2300. 
 2000 2050 2100 2150 2200 2250 2300 
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=90 2.67 1.15 0.87 0.81 0.82 0.84 0.86 
TFR= 1, LEMAX=90 2.67 1.15 0.87 0.33 0.35 0.35 0.35 
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=90 2.67 1.15 0.87 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=90 2.67 1.15 0.87 0.77 0.76 0.76 0.76 
TFR= 2, LEMAX=90 2.67 1.15 0.87 1.01 0.97 0.97 0.97 
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=90 2.67 1.15 0.87 1.44 1.37 1.36 1.36 
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=120 2.67 1.15 0.87 0.81 0.82 0.83 0.85 
TFR= 1, LEMAX=120 2.67 1.15 0.87 0.33 0.35 0.35 0.35 
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=120 2.67 1.15 0.87 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=120 2.67 1.15 0.87 0.77 0.76 0.76 0.76 
TFR= 2, LEMAX=120 2.67 1.15 0.87 1.00 0.97 0.96 0.96 
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=120 2.67 1.15 0.87 1.43 1.37 1.35 1.35 
 
 
It is interesting to see that for each scenario, the level to be reached for this ratio 
stabilizes after 2150. This is as predicted by the stable population theory, where the age 
structure remains unchanged if fertility and mortality rates remain constant for extended 
periods. Even though old age mortality continues to fall for the scenarios assuming a 
limit at 120 years, all of the action for these scenarios is only after the age of 60 and, 
hence, does not influence the 20 to 60 ratio. 
3.3  Scenarios beyond 2080:  Continents and world regions 
The numerical results for all 13 world regions and all scenarios are listed in the 
Appendix. This section only highlights a few of these regional results that have global 
significance. For this purpose, we only focus on the scenario that combines a long term 
fertility level of 1.7 with a life expectancy limit of 120 years. 
Figure 7 shows the results in terms of total population size for four continents 
(which result from aggregation of the corresponding regions). Asia will be by far the 
most populous continent throughout the projection period, but under this chosen 
scenario the total population of Asia will peak by the middle of this century and then 
enter an extended decline. Africa will be the second most populous continent with its 
population rapidly increasing over the 21
st
 century and then peaking during the early 
22
nd
 century according to this scenario. The Americas will also see some increase by 
about 50 percent followed by a decline, while Europe is seeing monotonous decline in 
population size over the entire projection period. 
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Figure 7.  Trends in total population size of four continents under the scenario assuming 
a TFR of 1.7 and a life expectancy ceiling of 120 years. 
 
Figure 8 plots these same trends in terms of the shares held by different 
continents of the total world population size. While the share of Asia would decline 
from currently around 60 percent to about 45 percent, that of Africa would increase 
from 13 to 35 percent. The share of Europe would continue to decrease from 13 to about 
5 percent of the total world population. According to this scenario in 2300, 80 percent 
of the world population would live in Asia or Africa. 
Figures 9 and 10 give two indicators of population ageing for selected world 
regions, again with reference to the scenario that assumes a TFR of 1.7 and a life 
expectancy ceiling of 120. For the four regions that already have relatively low fertility 
today, the trends are rather similar, with the proportions above age 60 increasing from 
around 20 percent today to 40-50 percent by the end of this century, and then a 
convergence to 60 percent in the very long run. This convergence is a consequence of 
the laws of stable population theory where constant levels of fertility and mortality will 
result in a constant age structure in the long run. Only Sub-Saharan Africa is still seeing 
changes in its age structure, because life expectancy will not have reached the ceiling by 
the late 23
rd
 century. For the proportion of the population above age 80, the picture is 
rather similar with the long term stable level around 40 percent for this specific 
scenario, which is based on a TFR of 1.7 and a life expectancy ceiling of 120 years. 
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Figure 8.  Proportions of total world population on four continents under the scenario 
assuming a TFR of 1.7 and a life expectancy ceiling of 120 years. 
 
 
Figure 9.  Proportions above the age of 60 in selected world regions under the scenario 
assuming a TFR of 1.7 and a life expectancy ceiling of 120 years. 
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Figure 10.  Proportions above the age of 80 in selected world regions under the scenario 
assuming a TFR of 1.7 and a life expectancy ceiling of 120 years. 
4  Discussion 
We can conclude that despite the highly speculative nature of this exercise, we can learn 
some interesting lessons in terms of long term population dynamics. We began by 
saying that the primary purpose was a sensitivity analysis, and in this sense it indeed 
turned out to be a worthwhile exercise. Similar to the UN long range projections, our 
scenarios have illustrated the great sensitivity of long run population size to very small 
differences in the assumed levels of fertility. Unlike the UN, which did not assume 
alternative mortality paths, we confirmed the significant role played by alternative 
assumptions about the limits to human life expectancy, not only on future population 
size but in particular on the future levels of population ageing. 
Do these results imply anything about the most likely world population size in 
2300? As discussed above, this is pure guess work. But if we were asked to give our 
guess as of today, we would say that a world of 2-4 billion people in 2300 is entirely 
possible and probably desirable. According to several criteria, a long term fertility level 
of 1.7 could be seen as desirable because it results in only modest discontinuities in 
terms of population ageing. At the same time, it leads to longer term population 
shrinking that is desirable from an environmental perspective, and results in a 
population size of between 2.4 and 3.5 billion in 2300, depending on the assumed 
mortality paths. If the future would follow this path, these 2-4 billion people would 
likely be well educated, healthy and wealthy due to the already massive ongoing 
improvements in educational levels. They would also have a good chance of living on a 
rather habitable planet, provided that not too much will have been destroyed in the 
meantime. 
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Although this is all highly speculative, this set of alternative scenarios can 
contribute to at least illustrating the feasibility of such a benign future. We have shown 
that entirely plausible paths based on an overall TFR of 1.7 would lead to such lower 
world population size in the long term future. This should come as highly welcome 
news to the environmental change research community, where numerous ecologists 
stress that around three billion people would be a sustainable population size for our 
planet. And even better, the world population size of 2-4 billion would not be reached 
through massive increases in mortality as predicted by pessimistic ecologists, but rather 
through a continuation of the already ongoing process of universal demographic 
transition, which does not stop at the population replacement level, but continues to fall 
to a lower level almost everywhere, particularly if women are becoming better educated. 
But this development is not yet guaranteed for all parts of the world. In a number 
of African countries, the fertility decline has recently stalled due to discontinued family 
planning programs and actual declines in female school enrolment. Major new efforts 
for universal primary and broadly based secondary education have recently been shown 
to produce the boost in economic growth necessary to bring countries out of poverty 
(Lutz et al. 2008a). These investments will have a great payoff in the longer run in terms 
of fostering fertility decline in Africa and curbing its currently destructive speed of 
population growth, improving the health status of the population, and helping to manage 
the planet’s environmental problems through a lower and sustainable total population 
size. 
While in the long run, the global population is likely to decline, and there is 
hope that this will result in a better and more sustainable development around the world, 
in the meantime, there may still be a lot of population growth associated with poverty 
and human suffering, particularly in Africa. This will pose a formidable challenge to 
humanity and development efforts over the coming decades. 
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Appendix 
The following Tables give the results for all scenarios at the level of major world 
regions. The scenarios were calculated on the basis of the original 13 IIASA world 
regions which were defined in the context of the IPCC Scenarios (Nakićenović et al. 
2000). Data on several more indicators as well as for single years of age and single 
years of time are available upon request. 
 
North Africa, Total Population (millions)       
 2000 2010 2050 2100 2150 2200 2250 2300 
TFR=IIASA, LE=90 173.30 207.70 307.10 337.10 315.60 274.50 238.50 207.10 
TFR= 1, LE=90 173.30 207.70 307.10 324.40 199.60 62.49 17.79 5.09 
TFR= 1.5, LE=90 173.30 207.70 307.10 331.50 257.80 151.60 86.96 49.95 
TFR= 1.7, LE=90 173.30 207.70 307.10 334.30 285.40 206.00 147.10 105.10 
TFR= 2, LE=90 173.30 207.70 307.10 338.60 331.80 314.80 299.40 284.60 
TFR= 2.5, LE=90 173.30 207.70 307.10 345.70 423.10 591.40 836.50 1182.00 
TFR=IIASA, LE=120 173.30 207.70 307.10 337.10 335.00 330.20 321.10 289.50 
TFR= 1, LE=120 173.30 207.70 307.10 324.40 218.70 92.81 35.39 11.04 
TFR= 1.5, LE=120 173.30 207.70 307.10 331.50 277.10 195.60 132.80 80.43 
TFR= 1.7, LE=120 173.30 207.70 307.10 334.30 304.70 255.80 209.60 156.50 
TFR= 2, LE=120 173.30 207.70 307.10 338.60 351.20 373.60 393.70 387.40 
TFR= 2.5, LE=120 173.30 207.70 307.10 345.70 442.70 666.40 1007.00 1458.00 
         
Sub Saharan Africa, Total Population (millions)      
 2000 2010 2050 2100 2150 2200 2250 2300 
TFR=IIASA, LE=90 611.20 799.40 1617.00 2166.00 1982.00 1739.00 1406.00 1106.00 
TFR= 1, LE=90 611.20 799.40 1617.00 2074.00 1216.00 428.30 124.10 34.39 
TFR= 1.5, LE=90 611.20 799.40 1617.00 2132.00 1656.00 1082.00 634.00 359.20 
TFR= 1.7, LE=90 611.20 799.40 1617.00 2155.00 1868.00 1492.00 1091.00 773.60 
TFR= 2, LE=90 611.20 799.40 1617.00 2189.00 2226.00 2327.00 2272.00 2165.00 
TFR= 2.5, LE=90 611.20 799.40 1617.00 2247.00 2943.00 4505.00 6591.00 9467.00 
TFR=IIASA, LE=120 611.20 799.40 1617.00 2166.00 1982.00 1752.00 1589.00 1424.00 
TFR= 1, LE=120 611.20 799.40 1617.00 2074.00 1216.00 435.10 159.80 58.96 
TFR= 1.5, LE=120 611.20 799.40 1617.00 2132.00 1656.00 1093.00 742.40 500.00 
TFR= 1.7, LE=120 611.20 799.40 1617.00 2155.00 1868.00 1505.00 1245.00 1019.00 
TFR= 2, LE=120 611.20 799.40 1617.00 2189.00 2226.00 2342.00 2520.00 2677.00 
TFR= 2.5, LE=120 611.20 799.40 1617.00 2247.00 2943.00 4525.00 7075.00 10910.00 
         
North America, Total Population (millions)       
 2000 2010 2050 2100 2150 2200 2250 2300 
TFR=IIASA, LE=90 313.70 338.70 427.10 438.00 410.10 390.90 372.50 354.90 
TFR= 1, LE=90 313.70 338.70 427.10 420.80 243.20 72.16 19.10 5.08 
TFR= 1.5, LE=90 313.70 338.70 427.10 429.40 315.70 181.30 100.90 56.22 
TFR= 1.7, LE=90 313.70 338.70 427.10 432.80 350.60 250.20 175.70 123.50 
TFR= 2, LE=90 313.70 338.70 427.10 438.00 410.10 390.90 372.50 354.90 
TFR= 2.5, LE=90 313.70 338.70 427.10 446.60 529.40 761.80 1109.00 1614.00 
TFR=IIASA, LE=120 313.70 338.70 427.10 468.40 490.80 511.80 500.80 478.00 
TFR= 1, LE=120 313.70 338.70 427.10 451.20 323.60 151.10 42.67 11.37 
TFR= 1.5, LE=120 313.70 338.70 427.10 459.80 396.20 280.80 163.00 90.94 
TFR= 1.7, LE=120 313.70 338.70 427.10 463.30 431.20 358.00 260.50 183.30 
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TFR= 2, LE=120 313.70 338.70 427.10 468.40 490.80 511.80 500.80 478.00 
TFR= 2.5, LE=120 313.70 338.70 427.10 477.10 610.40 905.60 1340.00 1954.00 
         
Latin America, Total Population (millions)       
 2000 2010 2050 2100 2150 2200 2250 2300 
TFR=IIASA, LE=90 515.30 595.40 833.50 948.10 942.80 896.50 851.00 807.80 
TFR= 1, LE=90 515.30 595.40 833.50 908.50 558.80 164.50 42.87 11.22 
TFR= 1.5, LE=90 515.30 595.40 833.50 928.30 725.20 414.40 228.50 126.10 
TFR= 1.7, LE=90 515.30 595.40 833.50 936.30 805.70 572.40 399.30 278.70 
TFR= 2, LE=90 515.30 595.40 833.50 948.10 942.80 896.50 851.00 807.80 
TFR= 2.5, LE=90 515.30 595.40 833.50 968.00 1219.00 1755.00 2556.00 3721.00 
TFR=IIASA, LE=120 515.30 595.40 833.50 956.70 1036.00 1101.00 1136.00 1098.00 
TFR= 1, LE=120 515.30 595.40 833.50 917.00 650.50 278.80 92.60 25.35 
TFR= 1.5, LE=120 515.30 595.40 833.50 936.80 817.50 572.00 362.90 206.00 
TFR= 1.7, LE=120 515.30 595.40 833.50 944.80 898.30 748.30 584.70 417.80 
TFR= 2, LE=120 515.30 595.40 833.50 956.70 1036.00 1101.00 1136.00 1098.00 
TFR= 2.5, LE=120 515.30 595.40 833.50 976.50 1313.00 2013.00 3085.00 4550.00 
         
Central Asia, Total Population (millions)       
 2000 2010 2050 2100 2150 2200 2250 2300 
TFR=IIASA, LE=90 55.88 65.28 96.02 104.10 89.34 69.82 54.35 42.29 
TFR= 1, LE=90 55.88 65.28 96.02 100.70 58.88 17.17 4.49 1.18 
TFR= 1.5, LE=90 55.88 65.28 96.02 102.80 76.36 43.35 23.98 13.27 
TFR= 1.7, LE=90 55.88 65.28 96.02 103.70 84.79 59.87 41.86 29.26 
TFR= 2, LE=90 55.88 65.28 96.02 105.00 99.13 93.66 88.94 84.42 
TFR= 2.5, LE=90 55.88 65.28 96.02 107.10 127.90 182.60 265.00 384.50 
TFR=IIASA, LE=120 55.88 65.28 96.02 104.50 97.29 87.07 75.78 61.11 
TFR= 1, LE=120 55.88 65.28 96.02 101.10 66.73 27.45 9.37 2.65 
TFR= 1.5, LE=120 55.88 65.28 96.02 103.20 84.26 57.88 37.31 21.64 
TFR= 1.7, LE=120 55.88 65.28 96.02 104.10 92.72 76.20 60.29 43.82 
TFR= 2, LE=120 55.88 65.28 96.02 105.40 107.10 112.80 117.40 114.80 
TFR= 2.5, LE=120 55.88 65.28 96.02 107.50 136.00 207.00 317.90 470.50 
         
Middle East, Total Population (millions)       
 2000 2010 2050 2100 2150 2200 2250 2300 
TFR=IIASA, LE=90 172.10 214.50 358.60 405.20 341.50 270.90 214.90 170.40 
TFR= 1, LE=90 172.10 214.50 358.60 392.10 227.50 71.63 20.75 6.05 
TFR= 1.5, LE=90 172.10 214.50 358.60 400.30 293.60 172.90 100.10 57.97 
TFR= 1.7, LE=90 172.10 214.50 358.60 403.60 324.80 234.50 168.40 121.00 
TFR= 2, LE=90 172.10 214.50 358.60 408.50 377.10 356.90 340.00 323.70 
TFR= 2.5, LE=90 172.10 214.50 358.60 416.70 479.80 665.90 937.70 1320.00 
TFR=IIASA, LE=120 172.10 214.50 358.60 405.90 380.00 344.30 305.30 245.00 
TFR= 1, LE=120 172.10 214.50 358.60 392.70 265.50 116.10 43.73 13.01 
TFR= 1.5, LE=120 172.10 214.50 358.60 400.90 331.80 235.10 158.40 93.05 
TFR= 1.7, LE=120 172.10 214.50 358.60 404.20 363.20 304.00 247.10 179.80 
TFR= 2, LE=120 172.10 214.50 358.60 409.10 415.70 438.00 457.30 440.30 
TFR= 2.5, LE=120 172.10 214.50 358.60 417.30 518.80 767.60 1146.00 1627.00 
         
South Asia, Total Population (millions)       
 2000 2010 2050 2100 2150 2200 2250 2300 
TFR=IIASA, LE=90 1367.00 1625.00 2289.00 2057.00 1366.00 741.20 398.10 213.70 
TFR= 1, LE=90 1367.00 1625.00 2289.00 2016.00 1052.00 283.70 69.74 17.16 
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TFR= 1.5, LE=90 1367.00 1625.00 2289.00 2057.00 1366.00 741.20 398.10 213.70 
TFR= 1.7, LE=90 1367.00 1625.00 2289.00 2074.00 1520.00 1038.00 712.30 488.40 
TFR= 2, LE=90 1367.00 1625.00 2289.00 2099.00 1786.00 1659.00 1569.00 1482.00 
TFR= 2.5, LE=90 1367.00 1625.00 2289.00 2140.00 2329.00 3349.00 4946.00 7297.00 
TFR=IIASA, LE=120 1367.00 1625.00 2289.00 2057.00 1388.00 892.50 574.40 351.10 
TFR= 1, LE=120 1367.00 1625.00 2289.00 2016.00 1073.00 381.60 128.50 39.60 
TFR= 1.5, LE=120 1367.00 1625.00 2289.00 2057.00 1388.00 892.50 574.40 351.10 
TFR= 1.7, LE=120 1367.00 1625.00 2289.00 2074.00 1542.00 1212.00 963.70 733.80 
TFR= 2, LE=120 1367.00 1625.00 2289.00 2099.00 1808.00 1869.00 1972.00 2013.00 
TFR= 2.5, LE=120 1367.00 1625.00 2289.00 2140.00 2351.00 3628.00 5743.00 8889.00 
         
China & CPA, Total Population (millions)       
 2000 2010 2050 2100 2150 2200 2250 2300 
TFR=IIASA, LE=90 1408.00 1468.00 1342.00 850.20 573.70 396.10 273.00 188.10 
TFR= 1, LE=90 1408.00 1468.00 1342.00 829.40 398.00 109.60 26.93 6.63 
TFR= 1.5, LE=90 1408.00 1468.00 1342.00 844.20 516.20 284.00 153.30 82.76 
TFR= 1.7, LE=90 1408.00 1468.00 1342.00 850.20 573.70 396.10 273.00 188.10 
TFR= 2, LE=90 1408.00 1468.00 1342.00 859.10 672.10 628.20 595.40 564.20 
TFR= 2.5, LE=90 1408.00 1468.00 1342.00 874.00 871.10 1250.00 1839.00 2706.00 
TFR=IIASA, LE=120 1408.00 1468.00 1342.00 857.10 644.40 516.60 401.00 283.30 
TFR= 1, LE=120 1408.00 1468.00 1342.00 836.20 468.10 186.50 59.82 15.44 
TFR= 1.5, LE=120 1408.00 1468.00 1342.00 851.10 586.70 391.60 245.30 136.40 
TFR= 1.7, LE=120 1408.00 1468.00 1342.00 857.10 644.40 516.60 401.00 283.30 
TFR= 2, LE=120 1408.00 1468.00 1342.00 866.00 743.20 769.10 794.50 767.50 
TFR= 2.5, LE=120 1408.00 1468.00 1342.00 880.90 942.90 1428.00 2214.00 3301.00 
         
Pacific Asia, Total Population (millions)       
 2000 2010 2050 2100 2150 2200 2250 2300 
TFR=IIASA, LE=90 476.40 541.70 699.20 665.20 482.30 303.80 191.00 120.10 
TFR= 1, LE=90 476.40 541.70 699.20 649.10 353.90 102.70 27.46 7.37 
TFR= 1.5, LE=90 476.40 541.70 699.20 662.50 457.90 258.10 144.10 80.49 
TFR= 1.7, LE=90 476.40 541.70 699.20 667.90 508.00 355.70 250.00 175.70 
TFR= 2, LE=90 476.40 541.70 699.20 675.90 593.10 554.60 526.70 499.90 
TFR= 2.5, LE=90 476.40 541.70 699.20 689.20 763.20 1075.00 1550.00 2233.00 
TFR=IIASA, LE=120 476.40 541.70 699.20 665.20 527.00 391.20 285.70 186.90 
TFR= 1, LE=120 476.40 541.70 699.20 649.10 398.20 159.40 57.14 16.45 
TFR= 1.5, LE=120 476.40 541.70 699.20 662.50 502.60 340.20 224.40 130.90 
TFR= 1.7, LE=120 476.40 541.70 699.20 667.90 552.80 448.50 360.70 262.90 
TFR= 2, LE=120 476.40 541.70 699.20 675.90 638.10 664.20 696.70 680.30 
TFR= 2.5, LE=120 476.40 541.70 699.20 689.20 808.80 1216.00 1865.00 2740.00 
         
Pacific OECD, Total Population (millions)       
 2000 2010 2050 2100 2150 2200 2250 2300 
TFR=IIASA, LE=90 149.90 151.60 136.50 86.96 55.07 35.78 23.24 15.10 
TFR= 1, LE=90 149.90 151.60 136.50 85.14 40.53 12.56 3.62 1.05 
TFR= 1.5, LE=90 149.90 151.60 136.50 86.66 52.35 30.61 17.77 10.33 
TFR= 1.7, LE=90 149.90 151.60 136.50 87.27 57.91 41.59 30.01 21.65 
TFR= 2, LE=90 149.90 151.60 136.50 88.18 67.19 63.39 60.67 58.03 
TFR= 2.5, LE=90 149.90 151.60 136.50 89.70 85.28 118.10 166.90 235.50 
TFR=IIASA, LE=120 149.90 151.60 136.50 100.00 73.67 53.59 35.43 23.05 
TFR= 1, LE=120 149.90 151.60 136.50 98.22 59.10 26.23 7.78 2.25 
TFR= 1.5, LE=120 149.90 151.60 136.50 99.74 70.94 47.72 28.26 16.44 
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TFR= 1.7, LE=120 149.90 151.60 136.50 100.30 76.51 60.10 44.08 31.85 
TFR= 2, LE=120 149.90 151.60 136.50 101.30 85.81 84.04 81.43 78.05 
TFR= 2.5, LE=120 149.90 151.60 136.50 102.80 103.90 142.40 202.90 286.90 
         
Western Europe, Total Population (millions)       
 2000 2010 2050 2100 2150 2200 2250 2300 
TFR=IIASA, LE=90 455.60 462.30 448.50 328.00 228.30 162.60 115.80 82.40 
TFR= 1, LE=90 455.60 462.30 448.50 319.80 159.20 47.88 13.20 3.66 
TFR= 1.5, LE=90 455.60 462.30 448.50 325.60 206.00 118.70 67.48 38.37 
TFR= 1.7, LE=90 455.60 462.30 448.50 328.00 228.30 162.60 115.80 82.40 
TFR= 2, LE=90 455.60 462.30 448.50 331.50 266.00 251.10 239.80 228.80 
TFR= 2.5, LE=90 455.60 462.30 448.50 337.40 340.40 478.70 686.20 982.90 
TFR=IIASA, LE=120 455.60 462.30 448.50 354.90 286.00 230.80 170.90 121.80 
TFR= 1, LE=120 455.60 462.30 448.50 346.60 216.60 96.99 28.93 8.02 
TFR= 1.5, LE=120 455.60 462.30 448.50 352.50 263.60 181.30 108.10 61.59 
TFR= 1.7, LE=120 455.60 462.30 448.50 354.90 286.00 230.80 170.90 121.80 
TFR= 2, LE=120 455.60 462.30 448.50 358.40 323.70 327.80 322.30 308.20 
TFR= 2.5, LE=120 455.60 462.30 448.50 364.30 398.30 570.20 832.40 1195.00 
         
Eastern Europe, Total Population (millions)       
 2000 2010 2050 2100 2150 2200 2250 2300 
TFR=IIASA, LE=90 121.20 119.50 93.72 55.67 37.26 25.69 17.68 12.17 
TFR= 1, LE=90 121.20 119.50 93.72 54.33 25.81 7.06 1.73 0.43 
TFR= 1.5, LE=90 121.20 119.50 93.72 55.29 33.50 18.37 9.89 5.33 
TFR= 1.7, LE=90 121.20 119.50 93.72 55.67 37.26 25.69 17.68 12.17 
TFR= 2, LE=90 121.20 119.50 93.72 56.25 43.72 40.92 38.82 36.82 
TFR= 2.5, LE=90 121.20 119.50 93.72 57.21 56.86 82.13 121.50 179.80 
TFR=IIASA, LE=120 121.20 119.50 93.72 57.96 43.94 34.93 26.30 18.29 
TFR= 1, LE=120 121.20 119.50 93.72 56.61 32.44 13.30 3.96 0.99 
TFR= 1.5, LE=120 121.20 119.50 93.72 57.57 40.16 26.73 16.09 8.77 
TFR= 1.7, LE=120 121.20 119.50 93.72 57.96 43.94 34.93 26.30 18.29 
TFR= 2, LE=120 121.20 119.50 93.72 58.53 50.43 51.56 52.21 49.96 
TFR= 2.5, LE=120 121.20 119.50 93.72 59.50 63.62 95.32 146.70 218.50 
         
Former Soviet Union, Total Population (millions)      
 2000 2010 2050 2100 2150 2200 2250 2300 
TFR=IIASA, LE=90 235.60 227.60 168.70 106.80 89.51 76.81 65.42 55.69 
TFR= 1, LE=90 235.60 227.60 168.70 103.20 55.17 14.99 3.49 0.82 
TFR= 1.5, LE=90 235.60 227.60 168.70 105.20 71.94 39.55 20.80 10.94 
TFR= 1.7, LE=90 235.60 227.60 168.70 106.00 80.23 55.66 37.76 25.61 
TFR= 2, LE=90 235.60 227.60 168.70 107.20 94.54 89.64 84.82 80.22 
TFR= 2.5, LE=90 235.60 227.60 168.70 109.20 123.90 183.40 275.20 412.60 
TFR=IIASA, LE=120 235.60 227.60 168.70 108.90 97.65 94.39 88.13 78.17 
TFR= 1, LE=120 235.60 227.60 168.70 105.30 63.18 25.18 7.48 1.94 
TFR= 1.5, LE=120 235.60 227.60 168.70 107.30 80.02 53.67 32.49 18.18 
TFR= 1.7, LE=120 235.60 227.60 168.70 108.10 88.34 71.47 54.32 38.74 
TFR= 2, LE=120 235.60 227.60 168.70 109.30 102.70 108.10 111.20 109.10 
TFR= 2.5, LE=120 235.60 227.60 168.70 111.30 132.20 206.90 326.60 501.40 
         
World, Total Population (millions)       
 2000 2010 2050 2100 2150 2200 2250 2300 
TFR=IIASA, LE=90 6055.00 6816.00 8816.00 8549.00 6913.00 5383.00 4222.00 3376.00 
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TFR= 1, LE=90 6055.00 6816.00 8816.00 8278.00 4589.00 1395.00 375.30 100.10 
TFR= 1.5, LE=90 6055.00 6816.00 8816.00 8461.00 6029.00 3536.00 1986.00 1105.00 
TFR= 1.7, LE=90 6055.00 6816.00 8816.00 8534.00 6725.00 4891.00 3460.00 2425.00 
TFR= 2, LE=90 6055.00 6816.00 8816.00 8644.00 7910.00 7666.00 7339.00 6971.00 
TFR= 2.5, LE=90 6055.00 6816.00 8816.00 8827.00 10290.00 15000.00 21880.00 31730.00 
TFR=IIASA, LE=120 6055.00 6816.00 8816.00 8640.00 7381.00 6341.00 5509.00 4658.00 
TFR= 1, LE=120 6055.00 6816.00 8816.00 8369.00 5052.00 1991.00 677.20 207.10 
TFR= 1.5, LE=120 6055.00 6816.00 8816.00 8552.00 6495.00 4368.00 2826.00 1715.00 
TFR= 1.7, LE=120 6055.00 6816.00 8816.00 8625.00 7192.00 5822.00 4628.00 3491.00 
TFR= 2, LE=120 6055.00 6816.00 8816.00 8735.00 8379.00 8754.00 9156.00 9201.00 
TFR= 2.5, LE=120 6055.00 6816.00 8816.00 8919.00 10760.00 16370.00 25300.00 38100.00 
 
North Africa, Proportion 60+         
 2000 2010 2050 2100 2150 2200 2250 2300
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=90 0.06 0.07 0.19 0.32 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.37
TFR= 1, LEMAX=90 0.06 0.07 0.19 0.33 0.57 0.60 0.60 0.60
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=90 0.06 0.07 0.19 0.32 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.45
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=90 0.06 0.07 0.19 0.32 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.41
TFR= 2, LEMAX=90 0.06 0.07 0.19 0.32 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=90 0.06 0.07 0.19 0.31 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=120 0.06 0.07 0.19 0.32 0.40 0.47 0.52 0.54
TFR= 1, LEMAX=120 0.06 0.07 0.19 0.33 0.61 0.73 0.80 0.81
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=120 0.06 0.07 0.19 0.32 0.48 0.57 0.64 0.65
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=120 0.06 0.07 0.19 0.32 0.44 0.52 0.58 0.59
TFR= 2, LEMAX=120 0.06 0.07 0.19 0.32 0.38 0.44 0.49 0.51
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=120 0.06 0.07 0.19 0.31 0.31 0.34 0.38 0.39
         
Sub Saharan Africa, Proportion 60+         
 2000 2010 2050 2100 2150 2200 2250 2300
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=90 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.19 0.30 0.37 0.39 0.39
TFR= 1, LEMAX=90 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.20 0.49 0.59 0.61 0.61
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=90 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.20 0.36 0.44 0.46 0.46
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=90 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.19 0.32 0.39 0.41 0.41
TFR= 2, LEMAX=90 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.19 0.27 0.33 0.35 0.35
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=90 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.19 0.21 0.25 0.26 0.27
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=120 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.19 0.30 0.37 0.45 0.52
TFR= 1, LEMAX=120 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.20 0.49 0.59 0.69 0.77
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=120 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.20 0.36 0.44 0.53 0.61
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=120 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.19 0.32 0.40 0.48 0.55
TFR= 2, LEMAX=120 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.19 0.27 0.34 0.41 0.47
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=120 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.19 0.21 0.26 0.31 0.36
         
North America, Proportion 60+         
 2000 2010 2050 2100 2150 2200 2250 2300
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=90 0.16 0.18 0.29 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34
TFR= 1, LEMAX=90 0.16 0.18 0.29 0.37 0.57 0.61 0.61 0.61
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=90 0.16 0.18 0.29 0.36 0.44 0.46 0.46 0.46
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=90 0.16 0.18 0.29 0.36 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.41
TFR= 2, LEMAX=90 0.16 0.18 0.29 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=90 0.16 0.18 0.29 0.35 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.26
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=120 0.16 0.18 0.29 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.51 0.51
TFR= 1, LEMAX=120 0.16 0.18 0.29 0.41 0.68 0.81 0.83 0.83
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TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=120 0.16 0.18 0.29 0.40 0.56 0.65 0.66 0.66
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=120 0.16 0.18 0.29 0.40 0.51 0.59 0.60 0.60
TFR= 2, LEMAX=120 0.16 0.18 0.29 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.51 0.51
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=120 0.16 0.18 0.29 0.39 0.36 0.38 0.39 0.39
         
Latin America, Proportion 60+         
 2000 2010 2050 2100 2150 2200 2250 2300
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=90 0.08 0.09 0.22 0.32 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35
TFR= 1, LEMAX=90 0.08 0.09 0.22 0.33 0.57 0.62 0.62 0.62
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=90 0.08 0.09 0.22 0.33 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.46
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=90 0.08 0.09 0.22 0.32 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.41
TFR= 2, LEMAX=90 0.08 0.09 0.22 0.32 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=90 0.08 0.09 0.22 0.31 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.26
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=120 0.08 0.09 0.22 0.32 0.40 0.46 0.50 0.51
TFR= 1, LEMAX=120 0.08 0.09 0.22 0.34 0.63 0.77 0.82 0.83
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=120 0.08 0.09 0.22 0.33 0.51 0.61 0.66 0.66
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=120 0.08 0.09 0.22 0.33 0.46 0.55 0.59 0.60
TFR= 2, LEMAX=120 0.08 0.09 0.22 0.32 0.40 0.46 0.50 0.51
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=120 0.08 0.09 0.22 0.32 0.32 0.35 0.38 0.38
         
Central Asia, Proportion 60+         
 2000 2010 2050 2100 2150 2200 2250 2300
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=90 0.08 0.08 0.20 0.33 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39
TFR= 1, LEMAX=90 0.08 0.08 0.20 0.34 0.58 0.62 0.62 0.62
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=90 0.08 0.08 0.20 0.34 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.46
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=90 0.08 0.08 0.20 0.33 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41
TFR= 2, LEMAX=90 0.08 0.08 0.20 0.33 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=90 0.08 0.08 0.20 0.32 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.26
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=120 0.08 0.08 0.20 0.34 0.43 0.50 0.55 0.57
TFR= 1, LEMAX=120 0.08 0.08 0.20 0.35 0.63 0.76 0.81 0.83
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=120 0.08 0.08 0.20 0.34 0.50 0.59 0.65 0.66
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=120 0.08 0.08 0.20 0.34 0.46 0.53 0.59 0.60
TFR= 2, LEMAX=120 0.08 0.08 0.20 0.33 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.51
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=120 0.08 0.08 0.20 0.33 0.31 0.34 0.38 0.39
         
Middle East, Proportion 60+         
 2000 2010 2050 2100 2150 2200 2250 2300
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=90 0.06 0.06 0.18 0.35 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38
TFR= 1, LEMAX=90 0.06 0.06 0.18 0.36 0.57 0.60 0.60 0.60
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=90 0.06 0.06 0.18 0.35 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.45
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=90 0.06 0.06 0.18 0.35 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.41
TFR= 2, LEMAX=90 0.06 0.06 0.18 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=90 0.06 0.06 0.18 0.34 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.27
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=120 0.06 0.06 0.18 0.35 0.44 0.51 0.56 0.56
TFR= 1, LEMAX=120 0.06 0.06 0.18 0.36 0.63 0.75 0.81 0.81
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=120 0.06 0.06 0.18 0.35 0.51 0.59 0.65 0.65
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=120 0.06 0.06 0.18 0.35 0.46 0.54 0.59 0.59
TFR= 2, LEMAX=120 0.06 0.06 0.18 0.35 0.41 0.46 0.51 0.51
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=120 0.06 0.06 0.18 0.34 0.33 0.36 0.39 0.39
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South Asia, Proportion 60+         
 2000 2010 2050 2100 2150 2200 2250 2300
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=90 0.07 0.08 0.17 0.34 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.47
TFR= 1, LEMAX=90 0.07 0.08 0.17 0.35 0.60 0.63 0.63 0.63
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=90 0.07 0.08 0.17 0.34 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.47
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=90 0.07 0.08 0.17 0.34 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42
TFR= 2, LEMAX=90 0.07 0.08 0.17 0.34 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.35
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=90 0.07 0.08 0.17 0.33 0.28 0.26 0.26 0.26
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=120 0.07 0.08 0.17 0.34 0.47 0.56 0.63 0.67
TFR= 1, LEMAX=120 0.07 0.08 0.17 0.35 0.61 0.72 0.80 0.84
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=120 0.07 0.08 0.17 0.34 0.47 0.56 0.63 0.67
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=120 0.07 0.08 0.17 0.34 0.43 0.50 0.56 0.60
TFR= 2, LEMAX=120 0.07 0.08 0.17 0.34 0.37 0.42 0.47 0.51
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=120 0.07 0.08 0.17 0.33 0.28 0.31 0.35 0.38
         
China & CPA, Proportion 60+         
 2000 2010 2050 2100 2150 2200 2250 2300
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=90 0.10 0.12 0.35 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41
TFR= 1, LEMAX=90 0.10 0.12 0.35 0.43 0.59 0.63 0.63 0.63
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=90 0.10 0.12 0.35 0.43 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.47
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=90 0.10 0.12 0.35 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41
TFR= 2, LEMAX=90 0.10 0.12 0.35 0.42 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=90 0.10 0.12 0.35 0.41 0.28 0.26 0.26 0.26
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=120 0.10 0.12 0.35 0.43 0.48 0.55 0.60 0.60
TFR= 1, LEMAX=120 0.10 0.12 0.35 0.44 0.65 0.78 0.83 0.84
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=120 0.10 0.12 0.35 0.43 0.52 0.61 0.66 0.67
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=120 0.10 0.12 0.35 0.43 0.48 0.55 0.60 0.60
TFR= 2, LEMAX=120 0.10 0.12 0.35 0.42 0.41 0.46 0.50 0.51
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=120 0.10 0.12 0.35 0.42 0.33 0.35 0.38 0.38
         
Pacific Asia, Proportion 60+         
 2000 2010 2050 2100 2150 2200 2250 2300
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=90 0.08 0.09 0.23 0.36 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43
TFR= 1, LEMAX=90 0.08 0.09 0.23 0.37 0.59 0.61 0.61 0.61
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=90 0.08 0.09 0.23 0.36 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=90 0.08 0.09 0.23 0.36 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41
TFR= 2, LEMAX=90 0.08 0.09 0.23 0.35 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.35
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=90 0.08 0.09 0.23 0.34 0.28 0.26 0.26 0.26
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=120 0.08 0.09 0.23 0.36 0.48 0.56 0.62 0.63
TFR= 1, LEMAX=120 0.08 0.09 0.23 0.37 0.63 0.75 0.81 0.82
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=120 0.08 0.09 0.23 0.36 0.50 0.59 0.65 0.66
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=120 0.08 0.09 0.23 0.36 0.46 0.53 0.59 0.60
TFR= 2, LEMAX=120 0.08 0.09 0.23 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.51
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=120 0.08 0.09 0.23 0.34 0.32 0.34 0.38 0.39
         
Pacific OECD, Proportion 60+         
 2000 2010 2050 2100 2150 2200 2250 2300
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=90 0.22 0.27 0.43 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.42
TFR= 1, LEMAX=90 0.22 0.27 0.43 0.45 0.57 0.59 0.59 0.59
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=90 0.22 0.27 0.43 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=90 0.22 0.27 0.43 0.44 0.41 0.40 0.40 0.40
TFR= 2, LEMAX=90 0.22 0.27 0.43 0.43 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.34
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TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=90 0.22 0.27 0.43 0.43 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.27
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=120 0.22 0.27 0.43 0.51 0.57 0.61 0.62 0.62
TFR= 1, LEMAX=120 0.22 0.27 0.43 0.52 0.71 0.81 0.81 0.81
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=120 0.22 0.27 0.43 0.51 0.59 0.65 0.65 0.65
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=120 0.22 0.27 0.43 0.51 0.55 0.59 0.59 0.59
TFR= 2, LEMAX=120 0.22 0.27 0.43 0.51 0.49 0.50 0.51 0.51
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=120 0.22 0.27 0.43 0.50 0.41 0.39 0.39 0.39
         
Western Europe, Proportion 60+         
 2000 2010 2050 2100 2150 2200 2250 2300
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=90 0.20 0.21 0.37 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41
TFR= 1, LEMAX=90 0.20 0.21 0.37 0.43 0.58 0.61 0.60 0.60
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=90 0.20 0.21 0.37 0.42 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=90 0.20 0.21 0.37 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41
TFR= 2, LEMAX=90 0.20 0.21 0.37 0.41 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.34
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=90 0.20 0.21 0.37 0.41 0.28 0.26 0.26 0.26
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=120 0.20 0.21 0.37 0.46 0.52 0.58 0.59 0.60
TFR= 1, LEMAX=120 0.20 0.21 0.37 0.47 0.69 0.80 0.82 0.82
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=120 0.20 0.21 0.37 0.46 0.57 0.64 0.66 0.66
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=120 0.20 0.21 0.37 0.46 0.52 0.58 0.59 0.60
TFR= 2, LEMAX=120 0.20 0.21 0.37 0.46 0.46 0.50 0.51 0.51
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=120 0.20 0.21 0.37 0.45 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.39
         
Eastern Europe, Proportion 60+         
 2000 2010 2050 2100 2150 2200 2250 2300
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=90 0.18 0.20 0.41 0.43 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41
TFR= 1, LEMAX=90 0.18 0.20 0.41 0.44 0.59 0.63 0.63 0.63
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=90 0.18 0.20 0.41 0.43 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.47
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=90 0.18 0.20 0.41 0.43 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41
TFR= 2, LEMAX=90 0.18 0.20 0.41 0.42 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=90 0.18 0.20 0.41 0.42 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.26
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=120 0.18 0.20 0.41 0.45 0.50 0.57 0.60 0.60
TFR= 1, LEMAX=120 0.18 0.20 0.41 0.46 0.67 0.80 0.84 0.84
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=120 0.18 0.20 0.41 0.45 0.55 0.63 0.67 0.67
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=120 0.18 0.20 0.41 0.45 0.50 0.57 0.60 0.60
TFR= 2, LEMAX=120 0.18 0.20 0.41 0.45 0.44 0.48 0.51 0.51
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=120 0.18 0.20 0.41 0.44 0.35 0.36 0.38 0.38
         
Former Soviet Union, Proportion 60+        
 2000 2010 2050 2100 2150 2200 2250 2300
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=90 0.19 0.19 0.40 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37
TFR= 1, LEMAX=90 0.19 0.19 0.40 0.39 0.58 0.64 0.64 0.64
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=90 0.19 0.19 0.40 0.38 0.45 0.47 0.47 0.47
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=90 0.19 0.19 0.40 0.38 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.42
TFR= 2, LEMAX=90 0.19 0.19 0.40 0.38 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=90 0.19 0.19 0.40 0.37 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.26
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=120 0.19 0.19 0.40 0.39 0.42 0.48 0.52 0.54
TFR= 1, LEMAX=120 0.19 0.19 0.40 0.40 0.64 0.78 0.83 0.85
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=120 0.19 0.19 0.40 0.40 0.51 0.61 0.66 0.68
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=120 0.19 0.19 0.40 0.39 0.46 0.54 0.59 0.61
TFR= 2, LEMAX=120 0.19 0.19 0.40 0.39 0.40 0.45 0.49 0.51
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=120 0.19 0.19 0.40 0.38 0.31 0.33 0.36 0.38
 31
World, Proportion 60+         
 2000 2010 2050 2100 2150 2200 2250 2300
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=90 0.10 0.11 0.22 0.32 0.37 0.39 0.39 0.38
TFR= 1, LEMAX=90 0.10 0.11 0.22 0.33 0.56 0.61 0.61 0.61
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=90 0.10 0.11 0.22 0.32 0.43 0.46 0.46 0.46
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=90 0.10 0.11 0.22 0.32 0.39 0.41 0.41 0.41
TFR= 2, LEMAX=90 0.10 0.11 0.22 0.31 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.35
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=90 0.10 0.11 0.22 0.31 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=120 0.10 0.11 0.22 0.32 0.41 0.48 0.52 0.54
TFR= 1, LEMAX=120 0.10 0.11 0.22 0.33 0.60 0.72 0.78 0.81
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=120 0.10 0.11 0.22 0.33 0.47 0.56 0.62 0.65
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=120 0.10 0.11 0.22 0.32 0.42 0.50 0.55 0.58
TFR= 2, LEMAX=120 0.10 0.11 0.22 0.32 0.37 0.42 0.47 0.50
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=120 0.10 0.11 0.22 0.31 0.29 0.32 0.36 0.38
 
North Africa, Proportion 80+        
 2000 2010 2050 2100 2150 2200 2250 2300 
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=90 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 
TFR= 1, LEMAX=90 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.10 0.21 0.28 0.28 0.28 
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=90 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.10 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=90 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16 
TFR= 2, LEMAX=90 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=90 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=120 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.18 0.27 0.34 0.36 
TFR= 1, LEMAX=120 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.10 0.27 0.51 0.63 0.66 
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=120 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.10 0.22 0.36 0.45 0.48 
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=120 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.20 0.31 0.39 0.42 
TFR= 2, LEMAX=120 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.17 0.25 0.32 0.34 
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=120 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.14 0.18 0.23 0.24 
         
Sub Saharan Africa, Proportion 80+        
 2000 2010 2050 2100 2150 2200 2250 2300 
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=90 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.13 0.14 0.14 
TFR= 1, LEMAX=90 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.11 0.25 0.27 0.28 
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=90 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.16 0.18 0.18 
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=90 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.14 0.15 0.15 
TFR= 2, LEMAX=90 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.11 0.12 0.12 
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=90 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.09 
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=120 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.13 0.23 0.32 
TFR= 1, LEMAX=120 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.11 0.26 0.43 0.57 
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=120 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.17 0.29 0.40 
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=120 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.14 0.25 0.35 
TFR= 2, LEMAX=120 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.11 0.20 0.28 
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=120 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.14 0.20 
         
North America, Proportion 80+        
 2000 2010 2050 2100 2150 2200 2250 2300 
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=90 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 
TFR= 1, LEMAX=90 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.14 0.21 0.29 0.28 0.28 
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=90 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.13 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.18 
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=90 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.16 
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TFR= 2, LEMAX=90 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=90 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.13 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.08 
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=120 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.18 0.26 0.32 0.34 0.34 
TFR= 1, LEMAX=120 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.19 0.40 0.65 0.67 0.67 
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=120 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.19 0.32 0.47 0.49 0.49 
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=120 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.18 0.30 0.40 0.42 0.42 
TFR= 2, LEMAX=120 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.18 0.26 0.32 0.34 0.34 
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=120 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.18 0.21 0.22 0.24 0.24 
         
Latin America, Proportion 80+        
 2000 2010 2050 2100 2150 2200 2250 2300 
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=90 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 
TFR= 1, LEMAX=90 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.11 0.21 0.29 0.29 0.29 
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=90 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.16 0.19 0.19 0.19 
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=90 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16 
TFR= 2, LEMAX=90 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=90 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=120 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.11 0.20 0.28 0.33 0.34 
TFR= 1, LEMAX=120 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.11 0.31 0.57 0.66 0.68 
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=120 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.11 0.25 0.40 0.48 0.49 
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=120 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.11 0.23 0.35 0.41 0.42 
TFR= 2, LEMAX=120 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.11 0.20 0.28 0.33 0.34 
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=120 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.11 0.15 0.19 0.23 0.23 
         
Central Asia, Proportion 80+        
 2000 2010 2050 2100 2150 2200 2250 2300 
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=90 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.10 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 
TFR= 1, LEMAX=90 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.11 0.22 0.29 0.29 0.29 
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=90 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.11 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.19 
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=90 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.10 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16 
TFR= 2, LEMAX=90 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=90 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=120 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.11 0.21 0.30 0.37 0.39 
TFR= 1, LEMAX=120 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.11 0.31 0.55 0.65 0.67 
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=120 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.11 0.24 0.38 0.47 0.49 
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=120 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.11 0.22 0.33 0.40 0.42 
TFR= 2, LEMAX=120 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.11 0.19 0.26 0.32 0.34 
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=120 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.10 0.15 0.18 0.22 0.23 
         
Middle East, Proportion 80+        
 2000 2010 2050 2100 2150 2200 2250 2300 
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=90 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 
TFR= 1, LEMAX=90 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.12 0.22 0.28 0.27 0.27 
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=90 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.12 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=90 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.12 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16 
TFR= 2, LEMAX=90 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.13 
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=90 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=120 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.12 0.22 0.32 0.38 0.39 
TFR= 1, LEMAX=120 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.12 0.32 0.55 0.65 0.65 
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=120 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.12 0.26 0.39 0.47 0.47 
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=120 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.12 0.23 0.34 0.41 0.42 
TFR= 2, LEMAX=120 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.12 0.20 0.28 0.34 0.34 
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TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=120 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.12 0.16 0.20 0.24 0.24 
         
South Asia, Proportion 80+        
 2000 2010 2050 2100 2150 2200 2250 2300 
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=90 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.19 
TFR= 1, LEMAX=90 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.24 0.30 0.30 0.30 
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=90 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.19 
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=90 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.16 
TFR= 2, LEMAX=90 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=90 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.09 
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=120 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.20 0.32 0.43 0.49 
TFR= 1, LEMAX=120 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.25 0.47 0.61 0.69 
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=120 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.20 0.32 0.43 0.49 
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=120 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.18 0.27 0.37 0.43 
TFR= 2, LEMAX=120 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.15 0.22 0.29 0.34 
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=120 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.12 0.15 0.20 0.23 
         
China & CPA, Proportion 80+        
 2000 2010 2050 2100 2150 2200 2250 2300 
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=90 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 
TFR= 1, LEMAX=90 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.16 0.23 0.30 0.30 0.30 
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=90 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.19 
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=90 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 
TFR= 2, LEMAX=90 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=90 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.16 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.09 
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=120 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.17 0.25 0.35 0.42 0.43 
TFR= 1, LEMAX=120 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.17 0.34 0.58 0.68 0.69 
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=120 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.17 0.27 0.40 0.48 0.49 
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=120 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.17 0.25 0.35 0.42 0.43 
TFR= 2, LEMAX=120 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.16 0.21 0.27 0.33 0.34 
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=120 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.23 0.23 
         
Pacific Asia, Proportion 80+        
 2000 2010 2050 2100 2150 2200 2250 2300 
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=90 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.11 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 
TFR= 1, LEMAX=90 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.11 0.23 0.29 0.29 0.29 
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=90 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.11 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.19 
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=90 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.11 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 
TFR= 2, LEMAX=90 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.13 
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=90 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.09 
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=120 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.11 0.24 0.35 0.43 0.45 
TFR= 1, LEMAX=120 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.11 0.31 0.53 0.65 0.67 
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=120 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.11 0.25 0.37 0.47 0.48 
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=120 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.11 0.22 0.32 0.40 0.42 
TFR= 2, LEMAX=120 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.19 0.26 0.32 0.34 
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=120 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.15 0.18 0.23 0.24 
         
Pacific OECD, Proportion 80+        
 2000 2010 2050 2100 2150 2200 2250 2300 
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=90 0.04 0.05 0.14 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 
TFR= 1, LEMAX=90 0.04 0.05 0.14 0.17 0.22 0.28 0.26 0.27 
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=90 0.04 0.05 0.14 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 
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TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=90 0.04 0.05 0.14 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15 
TFR= 2, LEMAX=90 0.04 0.05 0.14 0.17 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=90 0.04 0.05 0.14 0.17 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.09 
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=120 0.04 0.05 0.14 0.27 0.37 0.44 0.44 0.44 
TFR= 1, LEMAX=120 0.04 0.05 0.14 0.28 0.46 0.65 0.65 0.65 
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=120 0.04 0.05 0.14 0.28 0.38 0.47 0.48 0.47 
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=120 0.04 0.05 0.14 0.27 0.36 0.41 0.42 0.42 
TFR= 2, LEMAX=120 0.04 0.05 0.14 0.27 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.34 
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=120 0.04 0.05 0.14 0.27 0.26 0.23 0.24 0.24 
         
Western Europe, Proportion 80+        
 2000 2010 2050 2100 2150 2200 2250 2300 
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=90 0.03 0.04 0.11 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 
TFR= 1, LEMAX=90 0.03 0.04 0.11 0.17 0.22 0.28 0.28 0.28 
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=90 0.03 0.04 0.11 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=90 0.03 0.04 0.11 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 
TFR= 2, LEMAX=90 0.03 0.04 0.11 0.16 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=90 0.03 0.04 0.11 0.16 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.09 
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=120 0.03 0.04 0.11 0.22 0.32 0.40 0.42 0.42 
TFR= 1, LEMAX=120 0.03 0.04 0.11 0.23 0.42 0.64 0.66 0.66 
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=120 0.03 0.04 0.11 0.22 0.34 0.46 0.48 0.48 
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=120 0.03 0.04 0.11 0.22 0.32 0.40 0.42 0.42 
TFR= 2, LEMAX=120 0.03 0.04 0.11 0.22 0.28 0.32 0.34 0.34 
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=120 0.03 0.04 0.11 0.21 0.23 0.22 0.24 0.24 
         
Eastern Europe, Proportion 80+        
 2000 2010 2050 2100 2150 2200 2250 2300 
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=90 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 
TFR= 1, LEMAX=90 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.17 0.23 0.30 0.30 0.30 
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=90 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.19 
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=90 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 
TFR= 2, LEMAX=90 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.17 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.13 
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=90 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.16 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.08 
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=120 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.20 0.28 0.37 0.42 0.43 
TFR= 1, LEMAX=120 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.20 0.38 0.62 0.68 0.69 
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=120 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.20 0.31 0.43 0.49 0.50 
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=120 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.20 0.28 0.37 0.42 0.43 
TFR= 2, LEMAX=120 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.20 0.24 0.29 0.34 0.34 
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=120 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.23 0.23 
         
Former Soviet Union, Proportion 80+        
 2000 2010 2050 2100 2150 2200 2250 2300 
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=90 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 
TFR= 1, LEMAX=90 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.14 0.22 0.31 0.31 0.31 
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=90 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.14 0.17 0.20 0.19 0.19 
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=90 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16 
TFR= 2, LEMAX=90 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=90 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.13 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.08 
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=120 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.15 0.20 0.29 0.35 0.37 
TFR= 1, LEMAX=120 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.15 0.31 0.58 0.67 0.70 
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=120 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.15 0.24 0.40 0.47 0.50 
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=120 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.15 0.22 0.34 0.40 0.43 
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TFR= 2, LEMAX=120 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.15 0.19 0.26 0.32 0.34 
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=120 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.15 0.15 0.18 0.21 0.23 
         
World, Proportion 80+         
 2000 2010 2050 2100 2150 2200 2250 2300 
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=90 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 
TFR= 1, LEMAX=90 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.20 0.28 0.28 0.28 
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=90 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.15 0.18 0.19 0.19 
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=90 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.16 
TFR= 2, LEMAX=90 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=90 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09 
TFR=IIASA, LEMAX=120 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.18 0.27 0.33 0.36 
TFR= 1, LEMAX=120 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.26 0.49 0.59 0.64 
TFR= 1.5, LEMAX=120 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.21 0.33 0.42 0.46 
TFR= 1.7, LEMAX=120 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.19 0.28 0.36 0.40 
TFR= 2, LEMAX=120 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.16 0.22 0.29 0.32 
TFR= 2.5, LEMAX=120 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.12 0.15 0.20 0.22 
 
